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Home > News & Events > CLA Today Archive > Summer 2004 : Political Erosion

Political Erosion

by Joel Hoekstra

Over the past century, scientists have increasingly looked to such measures as soil erosion and deforestation as indicators of the future health of the environment. But Colin Kahl believes that such factors might also contain clues to the future health of political systems.

Kahl, who joined the U of M's political science department three years ago, has spent much of the past few years examining the link between environmental change and political upheaval. Most of the world's armed conflicts since World War II have been civil in nature, and control of natural resources is often a significant factor in the causes of these civil wars. "There's no question that the scarcity of critical resources is related to some conflicts—both current and historical,” Kahl says. Many historians have said, for example, that Hitler's decision to invade Austria and Czechoslovakia was driven by a quest for Lebensraum—in other words, additional farmland and forests (for Aryans, that is).

But while others count the environment as just one among a constellation of conflict-related factors, Kahl sees natural-resource degradation as the underlying cause of numerous social, economic, and political problems. "Nations that are heavily reliant on their natural resources for their economies and their social stability can experience a lot of turmoil if that resource base is eroded too dramatically,” Kahl says. And he's got research to prove it.

Take the Philippines, for example. Once covered in dense vegetation, the nation of southeast Asian islands had, by the early 1980s, lost four-fifths of its forests. Peasants hoping to make a living by cutting down trees or tilling farmland increasingly moved into the hilly interiors of the islands. The land, cleared of its timber and exposed to the elements, quickly eroded, forcing the peasants to relocate yet again.

Filipinos frustrated with their economic situation found little comfort in the policies of dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Communist insurgents saw their ranks swell as the situation worsened, Kahl notes. From the environment to economics to politics, everything was sliding downhill. Only the peaceful 1986 "people's party" revolution, which resulted in Marcos's ouster, alleviated the problem. The environmental problems remained, but the new government indicated concern for the peasants' plight—giving vent to the accumulated political steam. Membership in the rebel groups withered.

In Kenya, too—another country that Kahl has studied—squabbles over limited natural resources contributed to the demise of an autocratic government. But Kahl is careful to note that environmental pressures, while an important measure of political health, don't always result in political change. "Certainly there are a lot more countries that are experiencing these environmental pressures than descend into civil war,” he says. "It also depends a lot on the type of political institutions that the country has.”

Governments that respond to the environmental concerns of their citizens are least likely to see conflict, of course. In Costa Rica, for example, citizens' concerns about deforestation have led the government to delegate management of forestry resources to regional councils. "People who are dependent upon the resources of a region are more likely to manage them for the long term, to use sustainable forestry practices,” Kahl says.

But Kahl stops short of saying that a move toward democracy, a political system constituted to be responsive to citizen concerns, will necessarily result in environmental improvements. The more immediate result is often a period of relative stability: Believing that their views are being heard, people are less likely to agitate for drastic change. The wait for real action, though, can test their patience. "Democratic societies may be better for order and justice,” Kahl observes, "but the justice part may take a while.”

For American politicians and foreign policy watchers, Kahl's research has important implications. As a member of the U.S. Task Force on State Failure, Kahl is one of a handful of academics who meet regularly in Washington, D.C., to offer perspectives on potential political hot spots in the world. Although the task force doesn't explicitly consider environmental factors as a measure of volatility, the group does look at environmental problems indirectly, Kahl says.

“If we're interested in the development prospects and political stability of developing countries, we have to be conscious of not only the economic and political dimensions, but also the natural resource and environmental issues,” Kahl says. "That only makes sense: You don't want countries to destroy the base upon which much of their society depends.”